This paper aims to make explicit the concept of justice in Hegel's Philosophy of Right. It bounds it to the idea of liberty in its different ways of determination. It starts from the notion of person of right and indicates the fundamental rights that derive from the expression of this legal capacity. It highlights the right of necessity as a right to make an exception in favor of itself aiming the actualization of justice. It shows how, through the Law, in civil society, it happens the administration of justice.
Introduction
By constructing principles of justice to be applied to society's basic structure, Rawls understood Hegel's critique to the excessive formalism in Kantian moral and the consequent ethic@ -Florianópolis v.13, n.1, p. 188 -203, Jun. 2014. assured through the effectuation of rights, duties, and liberties on social institutions. For justice is, fundamentally, social justice.
We need to bear in mind that Hegel's Philosophy of Right, accordingly to what is announced in its first paragraph, aims to expose the underlying thread of the internal logics of juridical and social structures while actualizations of the Concept of Right. Hegel rebuilds the rational course of the internal logic of the determinations of the Idea of Liberty. The Science of Right, on its turn, is a part of Philosophy, insofar as it seeks on the latter its own guiding principle. Hegel proposes a "philosophical science of right," which has as object the "idea of right," i.e., the philosophical idea of liberty. In this manner, to expose the internal structures of the right means to show the unfolding of the Concept of Right while actualization of the idea of liberty.
3 Justice permeates all of these configurations. It actualizes itself through the actualization of liberty. This is the "content of the idea of justice." (Salgado, 1996, p. 467) On the abstract right, it is discussed at the level of individual liberties; on morality, as the right of subjectivity; on ethicity, it is focused on the subject-society-State relation. The challenge is to show how it is possible to conciliate justice and liberty on these instances of mediation. Put in other words: how to concretize liberty on juridical and social structures within reasonable standards of justice? How to conciliate individual interests and liberties with collective ones?
The guarantee of this actualization, ultimately, happens at the level of ethicity. However, isn't it proper of the Concept's dialectical movement to weaken or even to annihilate individual wills in favor of the affirmation of the substantial will? Isn't liberty, ultimately, recognition of necessity? Isn't there a subordination of individuals' liberty to the ethical authority of the State? And isn't the standard of justice justified on that basis? The purpose here is to refuse this suspicion and demonstrate that Hegel's theory of justice is founded on the principle of individual liberty equally mediated by the liberty of all. Self-determination and reciprocal recognition are key categories here.
Justice and immediate determinations of liberty
The exposition of the idea of justice on the actualization of the idea of liberty on the "abstract right," as the first figure of the Philosophy of Right, starts from a fundamental presupposition: the person of right. Person is the subject conscious of itself; it implies "legal capacity." To be person means to be subject of subjective rights. It is the most abstract and indeterminate manifestation and, as such, it establishes the fundamental equality of all human This notion of person of rights underlies the whole process of actualization of the idea of liberty on the juridical and social structures and, therefore, of the idea of justice as well. In this way, it needs to be set out as the expression of liberty. To be person means to be inviolable before justice and liberty. It means to be respected and protected. Honneth argues that the determination of the free will on the "right" is the "core of a theory of justice that seeks to guarantee the intersubjective conditions of individual self-actualization" (Honneth, 2007, p.52) . The satisfaction of these conditions is a demand imposed to ethicity, as we shall see.
The first juridical form of a person to concretize its free will is the possession, whence derives the fundamental right of use. It is the most immediate form by which a person relates with the world; as effectuation of its legal capacity it is the "external sphere of its freedom" (Rph §41). However, this right needs to be recognized in order to become a right of property, which, in its turn, includes one more right: the right of exchange. This recognition only happens through a contract. This is the mutual recognition of rights and duties. It shows that
Hegel's idea of justice, even on the level of immediate determinations, is based on selfdetermination and reciprocal recognition.
The exigency of the contract is due in order to guarantee the property and the possible transference of it to another person. It is established at the level on interpersonal wills. The most important here is the free will of the parties involved, not the thing or its attributes. It is the will what legitimates the contract. The recognition of property is the recognition of the ethic@ -Florianópolis v.13, n.1, p. 188 -203, Jun. 2014.
free will. It is a mutual concession of rights and duties. Bound to this idea of free will is the "idea of individual autonomy or self-determination" (Honneth, 2007, p. 57) .
Contracts are made between "immediately independent persons" through the manifestation of each one's individual wills. This manifestation is what legitimates the contract. Its origins are in the "immediate will" (Willkür); there is no social mediation yet.
That is why contracts are at the level of the abstract right. Persons express their immediate and, as such, contingent wills. "The particularity of the will for itself is arbitrariness and contingency" (Rph § 81). It means that these may not coincide with the "will existing in itself" the "universal will," i.e., on the level of abstract right, it can not be hindered the possibility of one imposing its own will over the other's, repressing it. Whence injustice arises. Disregarding the pact is unjust, for it is the expression of free wills. The contractual relation happens between "immediate persons, in which it is purely contingent whether their particular wills are in conformity with the will which has being in itself" (Rph §81). While particular, the will is different from the "universal will" and, according to Hegel, "if its attitude and volition are characterized by arbitrariness and contingency, it enters into opposition to that is right in itself, this is unrightful (das Unrecht)" (Rph § 81). The origin of the unjust lies on the immediacy of the will, which is contingent. We cannot forget that the immediate will is a moment of liberty. That is why the just-unjust relation presupposes free acts. It is important to highlight that a contract or another agreement encompasses the "right to reclaim its execution." However, that depends, again, on the particular will, which, by its turn, may act contrary to the right as such. This is where injustice lies. Hegel argues that the will "needs to be purified from its immediacy" (Rph §81). It means that it should pass by the process of mediation and recognition; the will needs to free itself from this "suffering from indeterminacy." Well, the wills are not eliminated through this process, but, through mediation, they are overcome and conserved in a higher level. To free itself from indeterminacy is to enter the dialectical movement of mediations and determinations.
At this first level of actualization of liberty, justice, and its effectuation, is bound to interpersonal relations and, therefore, to individual immediate wills. Hence the need for instances of regulation and guarantee on other levels of mediation. In the contract, the parties "still maintain their particular will." This moment is necessary, but not sufficient for actualizing liberty and justice. We are at the level of the immediate will, and its exercise is subject to injustice. Other instances of mediation and determination are imposed. We need to get rid of the indeterminacy of the immediate wills and search for the ethical substantiality ethic@ -Florianópolis v.13, n.1, p. 188 -203, Jun. 2014.
through the mediation on the social institutions, for it is through them that liberty and justice are actualized.
It is important to notice that the unjust is a consequence of the free will. The damage is provoked by the conflict originated through the confrontation between a particular will and the universal will, represented by the right in itself. The cause of this confrontation is a caprice of the particular immediate will that is completely vulnerable. As actualization of the idea of liberty in its most immediate figure, the contract is the product of two contingent wills, and, as such, can be terminated at any time. A contact between contingent wills has by its very nature the possibility of being terminated. Besides that, these wills may not necessarily coincide with the universal will. This, says Hegel, is due to the own logic of the Concept. The particular will can impose its individual right. Although it may seem that there is an excessive emphasis on the downside of the contingent particular wills, we have to notice that it is from the same wills that creative acts arise, capable of modifying the process of interiorization of the necessary structures of Right. It is the passage from indeterminacy to determinacy, mediated by the individuals' free wills. semblance of what "must be," the right in itself (the essence). "A semblance is existence inappropriate to the essence" (Rph §82). The injustice is a semblance that must disappear, giving rise to the right as something determinate and valid. The relation between the right in itself and the particular will is the relation between the essence and its appearing. The essence is the necessary and the true; the semblance, if not adequate to the essence, is injustice. This is an indeterminacy from which it is needed to escape.
For Hegel, there are three levels of this semblance of right, while particular, before the "universality of its being in itself" (Rph §83). Put in other words, there are three levels of violation (three degrees of violation intensity) that a particular will, subject to the immediate will, may cause: belongs to them. What happens is that, at this first level of injustice, the right is mistaken for the contingent particular will.
b) The deception
This violation has a higher intensity. In this case, "the unjust is not a semblance from the point of view of right in itself; instead, I create a semblance in order to deceive another person. When I deceive someone, right is for me a semblance" (Rph §83). In this case I am unjust. A misleading is provoked with the purpose of entering in a contract. Information is withheld by the seller in order to sell a good.
c) The violence and the crime
This is the most intense form of harming the other's will. The perpetrator wants to be unjust. He disrespects both the right in itself and how it appears to him (cf. Rph §90). He does not recognize the other's right, for his intention is to harm someone's liberty. The violation of a contract, the harm of juridical duties towards the family and the State are examples of violence. A. Valcárcel makes a remark about the crime as a form of violence: "Crime is violence against the right, and, for restoring the balance, this violence has to be nullified by the violence that rights brings implicitly. This violence, moreover, only expresses itself in this case" (Valcárcel, 1988, p. 338) . That is why the right is authorized to coerce. The penalty applied to the perpetrator is a way of reestablishing the pact and reverting the harm caused.
The penalty is not an act of revenge from society, but must be understood as a way of making justice to the evildoers. It seeks to restore the constituted juridical order. The crime is objective, and, as such, must be nullified through the application of the penalty. It is not something irrational, but "the expression of a free will that freely opposes to the right" (Valcárcel, 1988, p. 342) . That is why the perpetrator can be punished. In these three levels of violation, the free will of the acting subjects is presupposed.
Hence their responsibility. This collision of wills demands an instance on which they can be administered. This is the role of the right as law. And this brings us to civil society.
The right of emergency
From the right of morality point of view, it is appropriate to highlight Hegel's critique to the formalism of Kantian moral, especially by the "right of emergency" (Notrecht). For the philosopher from Königsberg, recognizing the universal validity of the moral law and at the same time making an exception in one's own favor is to incur in a contradiction. There is a defense of the a priori validity of the law, regardless of the circumstances. In contrast to this,
Hegel argues for the right of making an exception in one's favor in case of extreme necessity.
What is at stake is a threat to life. It is a right, not a concession. It means that "the necessity of the immediate present can justify an unjust action, because its omission would in turn involve committing an injustice-indeed the ultimate injustice, namely the total negation of the emergency refers to situations of serious threat to life. It is, in fact, a right that complements the right of morality, i.e., the right to know and will, while conditions of subjective responsibility. The issuance of a moral judgment cannot ignore these rights or avoid assessing them.
It is yet important to highlight-regarding the conditions of subjective responsibility, discussed by Hegel in the figure of morality-the right of intention. To know and to will to do are conditions for the issuance of a moral judgment. However, "an intention to promote my 
Justice and civil society
To talk about civil society and family is to talk about the institutions of social mediation of the free will. The instances of mediation of the idea of liberty find in ethicitythird figure of the Philosophy of Right-their complete concretion and realization. For Honneth, one of the minimum conditions the ethicity sphere must fulfill in order to free itself from the "suffering from indeterminacy" is "to make available accessible possibilities of individual realization, self-actualization, whose use can be experienced by each individual subject as practical actualization of their liberty" (Honneth, 2007, p. 106) . Since ethicity deals with the social mediation of the free will, the individual realization encompasses "reciprocal recognition." The intersubjective actions of the ethical sphere "express determinate forms of reciprocal recognition" (Honneth, 2007, p. 109 ) and individual actualization. mind that civil society is a place of conflicts, which result from the satisfaction of needs, the challenge is how to conciliate particular interests with collective ones. Hegel defines civil society as "the field of conflict in which the private interest of each individual comes up against that of everyone else" (Rph, §289). The search for the satisfaction of personal interests many times superposes the collective ones. Corporations are associations of individuals motivated by a "system of needs" that requires the mediation of the others' wills for its own satisfaction. Ethicity must fulfill the intersubjective requirement and, through this, actualize justice. Regarding the administration of justice, Hegel focus-among other things-on the safeguard of property and personality by justice, for it is the instance that seeks to assure reciprocity (reciprocal recognition) on the satisfaction of needs. It is the right exercised.
Hegel, in paragraph 209, insists on a basic presupposition: "a human being counts as such because he is a human being, not because he is a Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German or
Italian." This is the common base on which Hegel discusses the themes of justice and liberty.
From then on, to make justice explicit on civil society means to treat the right as law before which everyone is equal. "What is right in itself is posited in its objective existence-i.e. It is important to underline the contingent character of the administration of justice, which is acknowledged by reason. That is why the law must be a "general determination" to be applied to individual cases. The quantity of a penalty has always an arbitrary dimension. It cannot adapt itself to the Concept. But a decision must be made even though within numerous options. Hence the contingence of the right as law. That is why Hegel says: "this contingency is itself necessary" (Rph §214). Whence derives the impossibility of reaching the completeness of a legislation. "There is essentially one aspect of law and the administration of justice which is subject to contingency" (Rph §214). Well, this is proper of a normative science. Without contingency there is no liberty. For this reason, it should be recognized as having its right, albeit limited. The Concept of Right, i.e., the idea of liberty, when actualized, determines itself on the contingent particularity. Hence the difficulty of actualizing justice.
For all of those reasons, the law must be a general determination to be applied to individual situations and cases. Hence the role of legal hermeneutics.
It is important to highlight that the obligatoriness of obeying the law demands, most of all, that they be known by all, i.e., publicity is the condition for obligatoriness. Besides that, they need to be well specified in order to be applied to particular cases.
Justice and State
The civil society is unable to solve their own conflicts. These antagonisms, "The ethicity sphere must encompass a series of intersubjective actions on which individuals may find both individual actualization and reciprocal recognition" (Honneth, 2007, p. 110) . Concrete freedom requires that personal individuality and its particular interests should reach their full development and gain recognition of their right for itself (within the system of the family and of civil society), and also that they should, on the one hand, pass over of their own accord into the interest of the universal, and on the other, knowingly and willingly acknowledge this universal interest even as their own substantial spirit, and actively pursue it as their ultimate end (Rph §260).
Concrete liberty, therefore, means the actualization of particular interests in the universality; while conciliated, overcome and conserved (or sublated), but not eliminated.
Individual actualization implies reciprocal recognition, having, on this way, "an universal life" (Rph §258). Honneth is right when affirms that recognition means "a reciprocal affirmation without any coercion from certain personality traits that relate to each mode of social interaction" (Honneth, 2007, p. 108 'State' when it be able to rationally form his 'abilities', dispositions and talents, so that they can be utilized for the universal good" (Honneth, 2007, p. 122) .
In paragraph 261, Hegel recovers the paragraph 155 and reiterates the identity between rights and duties at the level of the "ethical State." The duties towards the substantial are, at the same time, the existence of the particular liberty, i.e., "duty and right are united within the State in one and the same relation" (Rph §261). An ethically correct State, i.e., a just State, presupposes equality between rights and duties. If the slave has no rights, he also must have no duties. Thus, slavery is, by definition, unjust. It is the most serious violation of the human dignity. It transgresses the principle "be a person and respect others as persons,"
presupposition that defines the "person of right." Hegel emphasizes the importance of the particularity moment and its satisfaction. "In the process of fulfilling his duty, the individual must somehow attain his own interest and satisfaction or settle his own account, and from his situation within the State, a right must accrue to him whereby the universal cause becomes his own particular cause" (Rph §261). The particular interests, thus, must be overcome and conserved on the substantial. The latter is the result of the mediation of the former ones. What is demanded as a duty from the State is equally a right to individuality. This State is just and ethically correct.
Final considerations
The concept of justice is directly bound to the effectuation of the fundamental rights stipulated by the "abstract right." While actualization of the liberty, they must be protected and assured as expression of the person of right's legal capacity.
Inasmuch as it deals with the determinations and actualizations of the principle of liberty as a historical conquest, the Philosophy of Right can be considered a theory of justice. This is made clear by the process of overcoming and conserving the individual rights in this dialectical movement of actualization. Self-determination and reciprocal recognition underlie these mediations. The suspicion that the Philosophy of Right brings along "anti-democratic consequences" in the sense that "rights of individual liberty" would be "subordinate to the State's ethical authority," is definitely weakened (Honneth, 2007, p. 48) . needs) is the basic principle of any institution that aims to assure the minimum standards of justice.
Since the State is the instance of actualization of the citizen's liberties, it is its duty to assure the protection of fundamental rights and liberties, whether individual or social ones. In doing so, it will guarantee justice. The contribution of Hegel was crucial in the sense of pointing the place of the actualization of liberty within the dialectical movement of social institutions. This presupposes, obviously, that the Concept of Right-whose object is the idea of liberty-dialectically binds Right, Morality and Ethicity.
Notes:
